JPRS 78142

22 May 1981

West Europe Report

No. 1755

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CONTENTS

POLITICAL

IRISH AIRLINER HIJACKED OVER HEATHROW AIRPORT

Tehran Destination Demanded

London SUNDAY TELEGRAPH in English 3 May 81 p 1

[Text] An Irish airliner with 108 people, including children, on board was hijacked as it was about to land at Heathrow Airport yesterday. It was apparently seized by a member of a Middle Eastern religious sect who demanded to be taken to Teheran.

The plane, an Aer Lingus Boeing 737 on a flight from Dublin, landed at Le Touquet in France, where the hijacker demanded that it should be refuelled.

The plane was about 10 miles from Heathrow when a man, believed to be [word illegible] and smelling strongly of petrol, burst on to the flight deck and told the pilot, Captain Eddie Foyle, to "fly out of British air space."

When the hijacker demanded that the plane should go to Teheran, Captain Foyle told him the plane did not carry enough fuel.

At Le Touquet police surrounded the airliner as Captain Foyle spoke by radio to airport officials.

A French spokesman reported later that the hijacker was not carrying a gun but had managed to compel the pilot to fly to Le Touquet without using any force. He was demanding that the plane should take him on to Teheran and he was also insisting that an article should be published in the British Press concerning the shrine of Our Lady of Fatima in Portugal.

The man appeared to be deranged according to police sources. He was insisting that the "Third Secret of Fatima should be revealed." This was a reference to a document said to be kept in a locked box at the shrine.

Airport authorities said police and firemen were standing by but passengers were "not coming to home at the moment."

The doors of the plane remained closed and the pilot was unable to talk freely. "He is only saying what the hijacker tells him to say," an official said.

The hijacker is believed to have offered to free the passengers most of whom are thought to be Irish on condition that the plane was refuelled.

Besides Captain Foyle the crew include Captain Frank Thompson, 39, and the hostesses Deirdre Dunphy, Mary Murphy and Marie McGlinchy.

A spokesman for the Civil Aviation Authority said in London: "Aer Lingus Flight El 164 aircraft on its way from Dublin to London due to land at Heathrow at 13.45, has been diverted to Le Touquet airport in France for refuelling.

"At 13.30 the pilot radioed the control tower at Heathrow to tell the air traffic controllers that he had been ordered to fly to Teheran. At that point he was on final approach.

"The tower advised him to divert to Le Touquet to refuel. He did not have enough fuel on board to make it to Teheran.

"There are no more details. We do not encourage conversation in these situations. It is best to keep all conversations to a minimum to help the pilot as much as possible."

Security at Dublin Airport had been stepped up since last Thursday when a group of IRA supporters tried to occupy a British Airways plane before it took off for London.

The Prime Minister, spending the weekend at Chequers, was informed of the skyjacking as soon as officials learned of it. After the aircraft landed at Le Touquet, Foreign Office officials began seeking contacts with their French counterparts about the safety of passengers.

Police at Heathrow were on "stand-by alert." Police, some armed, were ready to move on to the tarmac if the plane had touched down.

Troops who have a role in contingency plans for airport security were also put on stand-by.

Hijacker Detained

London THE DAILY TELEGRAPH in English 4 May 81 p 1

[Text] Laurence James Downey, 54, the former monk who skyjacked an Aer Lingus passenger jet en route from Dublin to London on Saturday, has been detained at Lille, France, on the orders of the district prosecutor.

He was taken to Lille from Le Touquet, where the plane was stormed by a French paramilitary squad, who ended the hijack without loss of life.

Under French law Downey can be questioned until late this afternoon, after which the prosecutor can order a further 24-hour detention.

CSO: 3120/8002

COST, QUANTITY OF CRUDE OIL IMPORTS ANALYZED

Factors, Patterns in Oil Importation

Rome RASSEGNA PETROLIFERA in Italian 13 Mar 81 pp 222-224

[Article: "Domestic Market--Analysis of Importations of Crude Oil"]

[Text] 1980 was the year of the Iranian-Iraqi conflict, not yet concluded; it has taken place between two countries that are among the principal producers of crude and suppliers of Europe in particular.

Despite the reductions in the growth of energy demand, and therefore oil demand, by the principal industrialized countries, importations of crude continue at traditional levels, going partly to build up the strategic reserves. For the users of the crudes from the territories of Iran and Iraq, this has meant substitution of them, which has been done only partially by bigger supplies from Saudi Arabia, with the balance acquired through increased diversification of oil-supply sources. This is the context of the Italian position, which, as is known, depends almost totally on foreign sources for its oil supplies, and which has been characterized by initial heavy importation of Iranian crude and then of Iraqi crude, substituted for the former in consequence of the political events that occurred in Iran.

Therefore it can be seen that the Middle East conflict has significantly influenced the composition of the imports of crude into Italy.

In addition to this penalizing situation, there has been the steady and progressive worsening of the lira's exhange rate with the dollar, the reference currency in oil-importation contracts. These two factors together have produced, in only 12 months, a net increase of about 60,000 lire in the unit cost of the crude imported.

The evolution of the month-by-month costs, with the lira-dollar exchange rate in parallel, is presented in Table 1, on the basis of the first data made available on Italian oil imports. These data refer to the principal companies that operate in the national market and are integrated or involved in commercial activity only, and they relate to a total of about 71.5 million tons.

Excluding the quantities of semiprocessed products imported and the residual products from the petrochemical industry, this tonnage is considered to constitute about 77 percent of the total amount of crude imported--a level that makes it possible to consider these data entirely representative of the market situation.

Table 1 - 1980 Month-by-Month Evolution of Cost of Crude Oil

Month	Lira/dollar exchange rate	Cost of crude (lire per ton)
January	805	169,460
February	810	178,100
March	859	187,235
April	877	194,660
May	842	194,705
June	835	193,640
July	832	197,990
August	847	205,600
September	851	207,245
October	873	216,280
November	910	226,250
December	936	231,170
Year total		195,500

Table 2 - Monthly Imports, with Their Costs (1980)

Month	Tons (X 1,000)	CIF Cost (dollars per ton)	API* Gravity
January	7,311	210.5	33.8
February	5,534	219.9	33.6
March	6,617	218.0	32.5
April	5,418	220.9	33.3
May	5,790	231.2	33.2
June	4,662	232.0	32.6
July	6,231	238.0	33.1
August	5,802	242.7	33.5
September	6,408	243.5	32.9
October	6,502	247.7	32.8
November	5,452	248.6	34.0
December	5,724	247.0	32.1
Year Total	71,451	233.0	

* American Petroleum Institute

The table shows that after the initial 4-month period of rapid cost increases, due in part to an exchange rate unfavorable to us and leading to an increase of 25,000 lire per ton, there was a certain stability until August, and then another upswing of costs.

In the second 4-month period, indeed, the rising costs imposed by the producer countries were balanced off by the strengthening of the lira, which, in subsequently slipping, produced a further increase of 26,000 lire per ton in the period September-December 1980.

Table 3 - Cost of the Crude Imported into Italy
(lire per ton)

Years	CIF Cost
1970	9,900
1971	12,500
1972	12,000
1973	16,500
1974	54,800
1975	56,350
1976	76,105
1977	86,150
1978	83,580
1979	116,190
1980	199,500
January 1979	85,020
June 1979	107,365
December 1979	152,500
January 1980	169,460
June 1980	193,640
December 1980	231,170

Table 4 - FOB and CIF Costs of Crude by Areas of Origin

	January	April	June	October	December
Persian Gulf	192.4	207.7	224.9	235.9	241.6
" " , CIF costs	196.1	211.7	217.7	227.5	242.0
Eastern Mediterranean	216.5	219.9	256.5	245.9	229.3
" " , CIF costs	235.6	--	228.1	219.8	240.0
Africa	245.2	249.5	266.4	268.5	269.1
" , CIF costs	273.9	253.3	234.8	272.3	277.9
Black Sea	240.4	259.8	256.0	261.0	262.0
" " , CIF costs	268.0	259.2	258.9	228.7	269.0
Venezuela	148.1	183.1	215.1	184.7	227.1
" , CIF costs	--	--	162.9	--	280.9
China	176.7	--	--	242.1	--
Mexico	--	--	200.1	235.4	--
Average Total	210.5	220.9	238.0	247.7	247.0

The average cost of about 200,000 lire per ton was, practically speaking, due to the costs of the second 4-month period, with the costs of the other periods balancing one another out.

The progressions presented are figured in Graph 1, which illustrates the rapid trend, such as had never before occurred in the course of a single year.

Table 2 shows the growth of costs in the international market, net of the additional burdens resulting from our currency's position, and also the quantities and average densities of the imports month by month.

Table 5 - Imports of Crude from the Principal Areas in 1980

Source	Tons (thousands)	%
Persian Gulf	39,977	55.9
Eastern Mediterranean	5,417	7.6
Africa	18,183	25.4
Black Sea	5,135	7.2
Venezuela	2,106	2.9
Mexico	194	0.3
China	332	0.5
America	107	0.2
Total	71,451	100.0

Table 6 - Percentage Structure of Importation of Crude

	1978		1979		1980*	
	10^3 tons	%	10^3 tons	%	10^3 tons	%
Middle East	71,385	66.1	73,064	66.1	45,394	63.5
Africa	28,558	26.4	30,241	27.4	18,183	25.4
Soviet Union	6,861	6.4	5,396	4.9	5,135	7.2
Venezuela	840	0.8	1,219	1.1	2,106	2.9
China	53	--	360	0.3	332	0.5
Other areas	338	0.3	208	0.2	301	0.5
Total	100,035	100.0		100.0	71,451	100.0

* Data calculated for 79 percent of total crude.

Graph 1



Key:

1. Lira-dollar exchange rate 2. Cost of crude 3. Lire per ton

Graph 2

Cost of Crude Oil in Italy



Key:

1. Lire per ton 2. December

The decrease in the petroleum sector's refining activity in 1980 is obvious from the first months on, with the sole exception of January.

The costs of the imports are steadily upward, with peaks of around $10 per ton in the months of February, May and July.

In relation to an average cost of $233 per ton in the last quarter of the year, further costs of more than $15 have already been borne, raising the initial cost of a ton of crude for 1981 to around 250,000 lire. This level is more than double the average paid in 1979.

The crude imported can be defined as the light type, with a density of about 33° API, equal to that of Arabian light crude.

Table 3 shows the evolution of the costs of the imports in the last decade, in accordance with average data reported by the Petroleum Union, to which have been added the values calculated by LA RASSEGNA PETROLIFERA for 1980. For further illustration, the growth of oil charges is shown in Graph 2.

The considerable increase in 1976 was followed by a 50-percent lower average annual increase (10,000 lire per ton), and then an actual reduction in 1978. This is to be

attributed to the reduction in both the selling price of crude and the cost of transport, with a favorable lire-dollar exchange rate occurring simultaneously.

The last period favorable to us was the year 1978; after that, one sees the rapid and uninterrupted increase in the average cost. Examination of the month-by-month data shows that at the end of June 1979, the increase were contained, while in the following 6-month period there was an average increase of a good 45,000 lire per ton.

Since mid-1979 the upward trend has been very rapid, for the reasons already stated, with increases of 17,000 lire per ton in the period December 1979-January 1980 alone, and then 30,000-40,000 lire per ton in each half of 1980.

In the 2-year period 1979-1980 alone, our market bore an average oil-cost increase greater than the rise from 1970 to 1978 (up 83,000 lire per ton as against 73,000). This fact has motivated the energy-conservation and consumption-reduction programs in progress, and thus the stabilization or contraction of the activity of the petroleum sector.

The sole possibility for reducing oil costs, for a country such as Italy that is almost totally dependent on foreign sources of crude, is the search for and acquisition of less expensive supplies.

Table 4 shows, for several sample months, the costs of the imports of crude from various geographical locations.

Costs are given both for quantities purchased FOB, to which the transport costs have been added, and to the quantities--smaller than the former--purchased CIF, at unit costs that generally prove higher.

The increase appears limited for the crudes of the Persian Gulf, considerable for African crudes, and even negative for the imports from the Eastern Mediterranean.

It can be seen that the imports from the Persian Gulf, which involve crudes of density equal to the average and annuals [as published], have had costs distinctly lower than the average for the entire year, with a certain approach to it in the month of December.

The Eastern Mediterranean shows high cost levels from the month of July, while they are present [as published] for all of 1980 in relation to the African crudes, which are more highly regarded than the others and to the imports from the Black Sea (Soviet Union). As in 1979, there is still importation from China and from Mexico, albeit in limited quantities.

On the whole, the availability of Persian Gulf crudes, in addition to the fact that it corresponds to the average type required in the Italian national market, resulted in a notable containment of the costs borne last year--a saving that can be evaluated at $10 to $15 per ton.

The proportion of such imports to the total is shown by the data in Table 5.

Out of the approximately 71.5 million tons considered for calculation of the costs under consideration (as against a total of about 91 million in 1980), the imports from the Persian Gulf came to nearly 40 million tons, or 56 percent.

The higher costs therefore affected 44 percent of our imports, with a deterioration, from this point of view, of the overall economics of importation.

Indeed, as Table 6 shows, the proportion of crudes coming from the Middle East (Persian Gulf and Eastern Mediterranean) dropped, vis-a-vis the figures for 1978-1979, essentially because of shortages owing to the Iran-Iraq conflict, by about three percentage points; the slack was taken up by other, more expensive supplies (Soviet Union).

Inasmuch as the data involved refer to 77 percent of the total imported, they are to be considered entirely representative, having been taken from the imports of the principal oil companies active in our market.

Analysis of costs for individual companies and the evolution, company by company, of the various situations in recent years will be taken up in a forthcoming issue of LA RASSEGNA PETROLIFERA.

Increased Cost of Crude Oil for 1980

Rome LA RASSEGNA PETROLIFERA in Italian 20 Mar 81 pp 245-247

[Article: "Domestic Market--The Cost of Crude in 1980"]

[Text] Following the already published article on the subject of the oil burden borne by our economy during 1980, LA RASSEGNA PETROLIFERA analyzes in this issue the costs borne by the principal oil companies operating in the Italian market.

The data considered refer to the month-by-month imports of crude, averaged to obtain an annual value. The differing position of the various operators on account of conditions of purchase, type of crude processed, existence of multiyear contracts, percentages of share-participation in crude-oil extracting companies, etc., can thus be defined. Fifteen companies are considered, and they include, in addition to those under state control, the subsidiaries of multinational companies and Italian private companies. The panorama analyzed is therefore practically complete (only petrochemical companies are excluded) also because the crude imported by the companies considered is about 80 percent of the total imported into Italy.

Table 1 presents the evolution of the quantities of oil refined by the various companies in the last 3 years and compares them with the total, which for 1980 only is an estimate.

One notes, apart from the decrease in imports last year because of the well-known drop in activity in the Italian petroleum sector, the increasing total proportion for the principal companies as a whole over the 2-year period. The group has gone from 73 percent in 1978 to 77 percent in 1980; this fact underlines the difficulties of the minor operators both in finding crude and in finding it at a proper cost. The fact that the drop in foreign demand has heavily penalized the operators that work on third-party account should not be ignored either; this situation affects the activity of the integrated companies to a limited degree.

The primary and growing role of the companies controlled by the ENI [National Hydrocarbons Agency] comes out clearly in this 3-year period; their proportion has risen from about 28 percent in 1978 to 38 percent in 1980. In a single 3-year period,

Table 1 - Quantities of Crude Imported by the Principal Companies (10^3 tons)

	1978	1979	1980
AGIP + IP	27,396	36,974	34,998
AMOCO	3,502	3,452	3,507
Chevron	2,925	3,591	3,486
Elf	800	813	728
Esso	9,633	9,725	8,977
Fina	2,011	2,137	1,910
Gulf	1,877	2,603	2,088
Mobil	3,548	3,038	3,259
Texaco	1,294	1,721	1,204
Total	5,194	5,618	5,976
API	2,844	2,666	2,538
Garrone	1,532	970	264
ICIP	500	201	76
ISAB	1,231	492	766
Mach	3,477	1,953	--
Pontoil	5,591	3,710	447
Montedison	5,531	5,151	--
Total for these companies	78,886	84,905	70,244
Total imports	108,035	110,489	91,000
% for these companies	73.0	76.8	77.2

AGIP: National Italian Oil Company
ISAB: Sicilian Asphalts and Bitumens Industry

Table 2 - Imports of Crude in Months of January-June-December 1980

	API °	Lire per ton	API °	Lire per ton	API °	Lire per ton
AGIP + IP	34.1	173,485	33.3	198,660	33.4	234,310
AMOCO	33.4	161,715	34.0	200,860	27.1	219,960
Api	33.3	175,520	27.9	189,730	33.6	253,510
Chevron	33.4	159,390	31.9	171,970	33.2	226,680
Elf	22.9	142,445	--	--	32.3	230,425
Esso	33.1	159,280	32.8	173,250	33.0	213,765
Fina	31.7	167,740	27.0	181,930	30.5	234,375
Garrone	23.9	142,235	24.2	172,760	--	--
Gulf	31.4	163,320	--	--	28.5	220,360
ISAB	24.4	179,870	23.6	176,390	24.2	237,770
Iplom	33.9	189,680	--	--	--	--
Mobil	33.3	159,440	34.8	197,630	33.4	210,755
Sarom	33.1	200,655	--	--	--	--
Texaco	31.9	147,730	33.3	180,645	33.2	220,735
Total	36.6	175,040	32.3	194,870	34.1	247,600
Pontoil	--	--	27.3	184,260	28.0	234,030
Monthly Average	33.8	169,460	32.6	193,640	32.1	321,175

Table 3 - Average Cost of Crude Imported (dollars per ton)

	1978	1979	1980
AGIP + IP	98.9	140.2	240.3
AMOCO	95.5	147.4	233.9
Chevron	99.1	124.8	215.2
Elf	96.1	142.1	237.2
Esso	98.6	125.3	212.3
Fina	02.6	143.9	234.3
Gulf	102.1	134.3	223.5
Mobil	98.4	137.4	235.5
Texaco	102.1	124.3	213.8
Total	102.0	143.2	238.1
Api	108.8	132.5	229.4
Garrone	95.8	131.5	213.4
ICIP	93.3	130.3	135.0
ISAB	92.9	159.8	219.7
Mach	99.4	129.7	--
Pontoil	97.4	159.2	220.9
Montedison	101.9	127.6	--
National Average	98.5	139.9	233.0
Difference 1979-1978		+41.4	
Difference 1980-1979			+93.1



Key:
1 Dollars per ton 2 Average

AGIP and IP imported about 7.5 million additional tons of crude, going up 10 percentage points vis-a-vis total imports, to an amount about equal to domestic consumption of petroleum products.

The greatest increase occurred in 1979, but in 1980 also, a moderate reduction of imports occurred along with a sharp drop in the quantity processed [as published].

The ENI therefore had to deal--at costs which we shall discuss farther on--with the other operators' reduced contribution to national consumption. Total, Mobil and AMOCO also did not feel the effects of the negative situation of 1980, and indeed increased their imports. Esso, though--the No 2 operator in the Italian market--does appear to be in line with the market trend, while for Api one notes a steady contraction of importations since 1978. The role of Garrone and Pontoil, and therefore of the controlled ICIP also, is distinctly reduced, presumably because of the difficulties of crude-oil supplies at tolerable prices and sales difficulties in the foreign markets.

In the first of these three cases, though, there may be a connection with the imports done by the ISAB--a company partly owned by Garrone--which increased in 1980.

Last year, the activity of the Monti group almost ceased, and therefore only Mach--which consequently does not appear to have made any imports in 1980--is indicated for it. As regards Montedison, the data used do not show any importations of crude in 1980. Finally, the usual levels remain for Elf, Fina and Gulf, which in 1980 went back to about its consumption of 1978, after the incre. .e in its imports in 1979.

Alongside the total quantities imported in 1980 can be indicated the average densities and the average costs of the crudes involved, thus filling out the picture for the oil-imports sector.

Table 2 shows--for the same companies--the densities and unit costs for the total of the crudes imported in 1980 with regard to 3 sample months.

This reference framework seems necessary in view of the fact that there was a continual increase in costs last year, which would not be reflected by a single unit cost for crude taken for the entire year 1980.

As regards the total average densities, one notes a considerable reduction that would seem to indicate a trend toward purchase of heavier and therefore less expensive crudes. The unit costs did in fact increase by about 60,000 lire in the 12 months, especially in the second half of the year (up 37,600 lire per ton). Considerable differences emerge from analysis of the data relating to the various companies.

While in the first half of the year AGIP and IP showed costs higher than the average, they fell into line in December, unlike the Api, whose costs grew in a trend higher than the average.

This is the case with Total, while for Esso, Mobil and AMOCO one notes the lower costs--due, as regards the first-named two, to steady availability of crude under favorable conditions (association in ARAMCO), and as regards AMOCO, to the heavy crude imported in December.

Recourse to especially heavy crudes can be noted also for Garrone, Pontoil and ISAB though at considerable costs at year's end. Generally speaking, the month of December appears to have brought high costs even for companies that previously had the benefit of limited-cost imports--companies such as Chevron and Fina, for example. But a positive trend can be recorded for Texaco, which throughout the year managed to keep costs at levels considerably lower than the average, even though it deals in crude of roughly equal density.

Consideration of the data for the various months of 1980 furnishes the average cost of oil importation for each company. The resulting figures are to be taken with a certain amount of caution, coming, as they do, from company declarations, but they are considered quite interesting and significant as regards the diversity of costs among the various operators. The economic importance of the variability of costs is obvious to anyone who operates in a market such as the Italian domestic market, in which the principal refined petroleum products are sold at nearly uniform prices.

Table 3 presents the results of the calculations done, in terms of dollars per ton, for 1980, and comparison with what was previously calculated by LA RASSEGNA PETROLIFERA for 1978-1979.

The ENI's commitment to the supplying of the Italian petroleum market resulted last year in the first high costs for it, in contrast with the preceding years, in which its relative costs were close to the average.

Excluding Garrone, Pontoil, ICIP and ISAB for the reasons already stated, the lower costs are to be noted for Esso, Chevron and Texaco, as was the case in 1979.

Vis-a-vis 1979, the situation deteriorated for Elf, Mobil and Api, while it distinctly improved for Pontoil and Gulf. In a general way, one can note that the rapid cost increase led to a diversification of initiatives by the various operators. While in 1978 there was a clustering of the various companies' costs around the average figure, there is a certain variability in 1979, and in 1980, a situation in which the average cost for the petroleum sector appears as the result of very different levels.

This is shown clearly by the graph on a previous page, in which the data are represented. Generally speaking, the companies' positions vis-a-vis the average are maintained, but the variations from it are accentuated.

It looks as though 1981 will only continue this trend, both through the prosecution of actions initiated earlier and because of a rising trend--a trend now difficult to restrain--in the costs of energy. One also sees that apart from the lira/dollar ration, which has been unfavorable to us for some time, 1980's cost increase over 1979 was more than double the rate of increase in 1979 over 1978.

11267
CSO: 3104

CONFINDUSTRIA STUDY ON PROSPECTS FOR INDUSTRIAL SECTOR

Rome RASSEGNA PETROLIFERA in Italian 27 Mar 81 pp 267-269

[Article: "A Study by CONFINDUSTRIA (General Confederation of Italian Industry)--Outlooks for Italian Industry"]

[Text] CONFINDUSTRIA's Studies Center has completed its usual annual report on the outlooks for Italian industry, reporting the results for the following principal variables: employment, investments, production capacity, index of industrial production. The time span indicated is the 4-year period 1978-1981, with a definitive balance sheet for 1978-1979 and a provisional one for 1980-1981. The figures by sector were collected in the period July-October 1980 and, generally speaking, lead to the forecasting, for the 2-year period 1980-1981, of a considerable trend toward investment by industry. This is within the framework of a presumed deceleration of the growth of production and the consequent substantial stagnation anticipated for employment levels. The principal expectations are therefore for gains in efficiency and competitiveness.

In this issue, RASSEGNA PETROLIFERA presents a brief summary of the CONFINDUSTRIA report, highlighting its most important aspects and stressing, in the general context, the role attributed to the oil sector.

As regards the index of industrial production, 1980 presents a situation that is satisfactory on the whole, albeit with increasing difficulties in certain sectors and without a repetition of the preceding year's high rate of increase. For 1981, though, manifestation of the effects of recession already present in other industrial economies is expected, led by a weakening of the production situation because of the limitations of consumers' liquid assets. For 1980-1981, therefore, industry presents, in the various sectors, relatively common tendencies characterized by the decrease in annual rates of growth, as is shown by Table 1. While the overall results appear to be largely determined by the evolutional modalities of manufacturing industry, only the electrical industries present rates of growth higher than the average, with attenuation of the slowdown foreseen for 1981 for the various sectors of activity.

The petroleum sector, like the chemical-fibers sector, shows the biggest production decrease in 1980, because of the well-known factors, not all related to the general economic circumstances. The situation changes in the forecasts for the year in progress, in which the sizable rates of growth attributed to the petroleum and chemical-fibers sectors take on the character of a recovery from the preceding fall, while for the other sectors one notes a slowdown of activity with increases that can be interpreted as the continuation of positive tendencies already in progress in 1980. In the current year, though, the petroleum sector cannot help but tend to recover the production levels achieved in 1978, in consequence of which it has had growth rates distinctly lower than the industrial average.

Table 1 - Indexes of Industrial Production
(annual rates of variation)

Branches and Classes of Industry	$\frac{1979}{1978}$ X 100	$\frac{1980}{1979}$ X 100	$\frac{1981}{1980}$ X 100
Manufacturing	+ 6.7	+ 4.0	+ 0.6
Foodstuffs and related products	+ 10.3	+ 1.7	+ 1.2
Tobacco	- 6.7	+ 6.7	--
Textiles	+ 8.5	- 2.2	- 1.9
Clothing, apparel, and working of skins and leather	+ 13.9	- 3.1	- 3.3
Wood, furniture and decorative products	+ 11.1	+ 7.2	- 6.7
Metallurgical	+ 2.4	+ 7.4	- 1.3
Mechanical	+ 5.3	+ 6.2	+ 3.8
Means of transport	- 1.0	+ 2.1	+ 1.9
Construction materials	+ 8.0	+ 7.5	- 0.2
Chemicals	+ 6.0	+ 3.2	+ 3.2
Pharmaceuticals	+ 3.6	+ 2.1	+ 0.8
Derivatives of petroleum and coal	+ 1.5	- 11.0	+ 9.7
Rubber manufacturing	+ 4.5	+ 0.2	- 2.5
Chemical-fiber producers	- 0.1	- 3.2	+ 24.5
Paper, duplicating, paper technologies and transformation of paper and cardboard	+ 10.9	+ 2.2	- 2.0
Phonographic and cinematographic	+ 9.4	+ 1.1	+ 4.8
Building construction and plant installation	+ 2.2	+ 2.0	+ 1.7
Electrical, gas and aqueducts	+ 4.5	+ 4.2	+ 3.5
Total for industry*	+ 5.8	+ 3.8	+ 1.0

* Excluding the extraction industries

However, the investment expenditures expected in the 2-year forecast period considered are going gradually upward and onto levels higher than the average figures. Alongside the stability of the average rates (higher, in any case, than the definitive figures for 1979), owing to the compensation between the expansion of the manufacturing industries and that of the others, there appears an amply positive investment cycle for the oil and coal sector, as is shown by Table 2.

It should also be pointed out that exclusion of the investments in the oil-coal, metallurgical, means of transport and chemical-fibers sectors would mean that the manufacturing industries were experiencing a 2.7-percent contraction from 1980 (as against the 5.2-percent advance), and industry in general would be at a rate of 1.1 percent (as against 5.6 percent).

As stated, the expansion in the sectors indicated appears to be connected with the programs of restructuring and reconversion of plant for the pupose of higher productivity. Also from the employment point of view, the oil sector shows an upward trend constrasting positively with the stagnation of industry in general. Indeed, as is shown by Table 3, almost all the manufacturing industries show a drop in the number of persons employed, which was larger in 1980.

Table 2 - Outlooks for Industrial Investment Expenditures*
(millions of 1978 lire)

Branches and Classes of Industry	Definitive 1978	Definitive 1979	Provisional 1980	Provisional 1981
Extraction	345,328	412,291	513,706	565,388
Manufacturing	6,306,968	6,354,065	6,464,917	6,802,146
Foodstuffs and related products	547,700	525,600	501,100	498,800
Tobacco	19,978	22,392	21,077	23,018
Textiles	511,060	537,600	520,500	523,000
Clothing, apparel, and working of skins and leather	222,300	295,700	229,800	225,900
Wood, furniture and decorative products	234,700	239,700	239,000	232,900
Metallurgical	663,800	551,314	698,180	821,270
Mechanical	1,096,836	1,170,824	1,163,453	1,155,662
Means of transport	744,019	696,500	732,000	978,655
Construction materials	469,250	497,550	500,150	493,050
Chemicals	980,000	1,035,000	1,065,000	1,000,000
Pharmaceuticals	115,500	119,000	118,000	120,000
Derivatives of petroleum and coal	174,067	146,965	210,830	272,860
Rubber manufacturing	112,200	120,000	115,000	115,000
Chemical-fiber producers	99,958	50,020	42,927	69,536
Paper, duplicating, paper technologies and transformation of paper and cardboard	306,400	337,900	299,000	261,900
Phonographic and cinematographic	9,200	8,000	8,900	10,600
Building construction and plant installation	504,473	517,767	528,599	535,968
Electrical, gas and aqueducts	2,020,551	2,160,040	2,461,561	2,624,025
Total for industry	9,177,320	9,444,163	9,968,783	10,527,527

* These comprise the expenditures made and programmed by the industrial firms for acquisition of fixed capital goods and entered in the firms' economic accounts, definitive and provisional.

The principal feature relating to employment proves to be a substantial general stagnation, with a moderate deterioration in the manufacturing sector expected for the 2-year period 1980-1981. In geographical terms, a decrease in the number of persons employed in the Center-North of Italy is foreseen, balanced by an increase in the areas of the Mezzogiorno. For the oil and coal sector, the aforesaid increase in employment expected is due to those areas, with decreases in the regions of the Center-North seen especially in 1980.

Table 3 - Outlooks for Employment in Industry
(units)

Branches and Classes of Industry	Definitive		Provisional	
	1978	1979	1980	1981
Extraction	67,250	66,292	65,782	66,295
Manufacturing	3,406,536	3,426,991	3,404,787	3,394,342
Foodstuffs and related products	241,890	246,040	245,560	244,430
Tobacco	14,039	13,708	13,496	13,486
Textiles	449,521	447,722	441,555	437,301
Clothing, apparel and working of skins and leather	414,470	423,640	414,910	408,764
Wood, furniture and decorative products	187,100	186,800	185,850	183,750
Metallurgical	274,000	273,100	274,350	273,950
Mechanical	748,816	747,553	746,016	752,927
Means of transport	299,663	311,194	308,527	308,127
Construction materials	217,469	216,828	216,300	216,200
Chemicals	195,700	195,000	194,500	194,500
Pharmaceuticals	62,927	63,824	63,500	63,500
Derivatives of petroleum and coal	16,622	16,458	16,600	16,735
Rubber manufacturing	66,060	66,000	65,500	65,500
Chemical-fiber producers	33,409	31,724	28,773	25,407
Paper, duplicating, paper technologies and transformation of paper and cardboard	167,450	170,500	172,550	172,420
Phonographic and cinematographic	17,400	16,900	16,800	17,300
Building construction and plant installation	1,448,800	1,440,900	1,463,000	1,480,000
Electrical, gas and aqueducts	151,921	153,300	153,852	154,129
Total for industry	5,074,507	5,087,483	5,087,421	5,094,766

Consequently, vis-a-vis industrial employment in the Mezzogiorno amounting to 25 percent in the 4-year period considered, the CONFINDUSTRIA report pegs the oil and coal sector in the 2-year period 1980-1981 at a proportion of about 39-40 percent.

Table 4 gives the estimates of production capacity, investment and employment for the industrial sector of complete-cycle refining (thus excluding petrochemicals processing and minor processing, and coastal and internal storage facilities).

It is noted that the previously mentioned increase in the number of persons employed is due solely to petroleum activity (with reductions in the coal sector), as is the case also with year-by-year investments, which almost doubled in 1980 over 1979.

The growth trend should continue in the current year also, with more persons employed in the Mezzogiorno and orientation of investments in the Center-North.

Table 4 - Complete-Cycle Refining Industry

(figures at constant 1978 prices)

Variables	Units of Measurement	Definitive 1978	Definitive 1979	Provisional 1980	Provisional 1981
Employment	units	12,420	12,520	13,020	13,210
Center-North	units	7,120	7,420	7,600	7,660
Mezzogiorno	units	5,300	5,100	5,420	5,550
Fixed investments	millions/lire	113,100	97,100	170,300	236,000
Center-North	" "	57,100	59,000	103,700	147,300
Mezzogiorno	" "	56,000	38,100	66,600	88,700
Production capacity					
Testing capacity	millions/tons	212.4	209.8	209.8	206.5
Center-North	" "	100.3	99.3	99.3	99.0
Mezzogiorno	" "	112.1	110.5	110.5	107.5
Balanced technical-commercial capacity available in year	1000's/tons	180.5	178.3	178.3	175.5

Table 5 - Detail of Exports and Processing

(figures at constant 1978 prices)

Variables	Units of Measurement	Definitive 1978	Definitive 1979	Provisional 1980	Provisional 1981
Processing by refineries	millions/tons	117.6	119.0	103.0	115.0
Center-North	" "	57.6	56.0	53.0	59.0
Mezzogiorno	" "	60.0	63.0	50.0	56.0
Exportation					
Quantity	" "	22.8	22.8	11.0	16.0
Percentage of production for export	%	20.6	20.3	11.4	15.6
Detail of Processing					
Gasoline	1000's/tons	16,349	16,530	14,500	16,000
Virgin Naphtha	" "	5,963	6,650	5,500	6,300
Kerosene and turbo fuel	" "	4,984	4,860	4,500	4,900
Gas-oil	" "	29,837	31,250	27,000	30,400
Fuel oil	" "	47,815	47,100	40,000	44,500
Other products	" "	5,621	5,710	5,300	6,000
Consumption and losses	" "	7,005	6,900	6,200	6,900

The data of Tables 4 and 5 relate to the industrial activity carried on by the complete-cycle refineries; the plants that do petrochemicals processing and those that do minor processing are not included. The data relating to employment and to investments do not include those parts of them that relate to coastal and internal storage facilities, distribution installations, and the automotive fleet.

As regards production capacity, the report in question forecasts a reduction of 3 million tons in 1981, to occur in the Mezzogiorno, vis-a-vis a final level of about 175 million tons, expressed in terms of effectively usable capacity.

A substantial recovery in processing activity is foreseen for the current year, after the considerable contraction of 1980.

This recovery is expected to be equal in degree in the two geographical areas considered and is attributed to greater demand, both domestic and foreign.

It appears that this forecast should be revised, though, inasmuch as the first definitive data for 1980 show--as already reported in RASSEGNA PETROLIFERA--processing levels around 97 million tons as against the 103 million indicated in the report.

Consequently, the level expected for 1981 should be reduced also, considering also the possible continuation of large monthly imports of finished products that characterized 1980.

11267
CSO: 3104/231

TAX REVISION APPROVED BY HOUSE

Nicosia CYPRUS MAIL in English 17 Apr 81 p 3

[Text] The House in its last session before the elections rushed the debate of outstanding Bills.

It passed eight Bills and left five others to be debated by the new House.

One of those passed was the Tax Rates Revision Bill which is given retrospective effect from January 1 last, the main feature of which is that it exempts from income tax the first £1,000 of income compared to £700 which was until now.

The rebate for children is increased from £150 to £250, for children attending higher education in the island from £200 to £300 and for children studying abroad the relief is raised from £600 to £1,000.

The House also approved the agreement reached between government and its public servants and teachers.

Another Bill passed concerns the tax on immovable property.

The House approved that 1.5 per thousand be charged as immovable property tax but property of up to 35,000 is now exempt whereas originally applied only to property worth £25,000.

Another significant Bill freezes for three months--from the date of the enactment of the law--of rent of shops and dwellings.

This means that landlords will be unable to increase their rents during the three-months period from the date of enactment.

CSO: 4920

EXPANSION OF SELF-HOUSING PLAN PLANNED

Nicosia CYPRUS MAIL in English 23 Apr 81 p 1

[Text] The Deputy Minister of the Interior Mr Petros Stylianou yesterday explained the government's new scheme to give people who are not refugees but were living in the south and lost their homes in the north without having a home of their own in the south to take advantage of the self-housing scheme.

However, families with normal residence abroad at the time of the invasion are not entitled to such assistance.

The idea of the plan is to assist Cypriot residents who face real problems of housing, Mr Stylianou said.

The Deputy Minister explained that under the Council of Ministers' decision the families whose applications are approved are not to be given "refugee" status but will be issued with a "confirmation" of entitlement to housing and education allowance.

The State is applying a policy of social justice and this cannot be said to be applied in practice unless all those who suffered from the invasion are assisted.

Re-examined

Mr Stylianou said that so far 226 families have applied for such "confirmation" and 229 cases have been considered. Of these 164 were approved, 18 were rejected and 46 will be re-examined.

The appropriate body which considers applications is the Rehabilitation Committee assisted by a governmental advisory committee with the participation of representatives of the parties concerned.

CSO: 4920

ECONOMIST WARNS AGAINST FRAGMENTATION

Nicosia THE CYPRUS WEEKLY in English 30 Apr 81 p 8

[Text]

The partition or fragmentation of our economic system through constitutional, administrative or other means must be avoided or minimized, says economist Nicos Vassiliou.

He told a Rotary Club meeting in Nicosia: "If countries like Britain, France and Germany have deemed it advisable to unify their economies to achieve higher levels of economic activity and welfare, it would be utter madness for us Greek and Turkish Cypriots to fragment our already minute domestic market and economy".

'A true paradise'

An undivided Cyprus with a reunified economy and a just and rational constitution could transform Cyprus into a "true paradise for all its residents", Mr Vassiliou said.

The speaker, who returned recently after spending some years as a UN expert in Africa, said the gap between Turkish and Greek Cypriots could be bridged much faster if the entire economy of the island was reunited "without any artificial customs or other barriers between the two would-be communal states".

Terrifying inflation

He pointed out that the north's close links with Turkey had contributed among other things to the importation of a terrifying inflation rate — 108% compared with only 13% in the territory of the Republic.

He argued that fundamental principles such as free movement, ownership and establishment should be safeguarded, not only because they were basic rights, "but also because they constitute vital conditions for bridging the economic gap between the two communities, and the smooth functioning and development of a free, democratic economy and society".

CSO: 4920

BRIEFS

PER CAPITA INCOME--The per capita national income at current prices reached £1,200 last year as against £547 in 1973, according to an official booklet issued by the Public Information Office. "This significant increase has been instrumental in improving the Cypriots' living conditions, which are now considered satisfactory by international standards," it says. The report gives an outline of the island's economic development during the first 20 years of independence (1960-80) with brief references to such sectors as agriculture, tourism and industry, as well as the reactivation effort in the years after the Turkish invasion. By the end of 1980, for example, agricultural output was 53% higher than in 1973 and exports rose from a mere £17 m. in 1975 to £34 m. in 1980. At another point the report says: "The fact that exports of manufactured goods rose from £15.2 m. in 1973 to an estimated £103 m. in 1980 is a measure of the success of the overall effort to revitalize the economy." But it warns that despite the economic gains, "the upheaval caused by the Turkish invasion has brought problems in its wake which tend to slow down further development." [Text] [Nicosia THE CYPRUS WEEKLY in English 30 Apr 81 p 8]

RETAIL PRICE INDEX UP--The Retail Price Index, compiled by the Statistics Department, went up to 149.82 units in March, compared to 148.52 in February. An official report said the increase was mainly due to higher prices for fresh vegetables, electricity and cigarettes. [Text] [Nicosia THE CYPRUS WEEKLY in English 30 Apr 81 p 8]

CSO: 4920

EEC COMMITTEE MEETS IN SALONICA

Athens ATHENS NEWS in English 29 Apr 81 p 2

[Text]

FOR THE FIRST time yesterday, the EEC Committee for Regional Policy met in the Northern Greek city of Salonica. The committee makes suggestions to EEC Ministers for the formulation of regional development policy and the allocation of funds from the EEC's Regional Development Fund.

Minister for Northern Greece Martis welcomed the members of the committee and briefed them about Greek policy on regional development, particularly as regards the districts of Macedonia and Thrace.

The Greek Minister stressed that Greece has tried to harmonise as much as feasible its agricultural policies with those of the EEC. But he said, there was need of an intensive development effort in order to do away with both regional and intra-member inequalities.

The government's regional policies it was stressed, aimed not only at stemming the outflow of population from affected areas but at creating the conditions which would encourage repatriation.

In Central and Western Macedonia alone the government hopes that thanks to its development programs 50,000 new jobs will be created in the next five years. And in Thrace — where industry was nonexistent before 1975 — there are now 205 industrial units and an additional 80 at various stages of completion.

CSO: 4920

CAUSES OF BASQUE ECONOMIC PROBLEMS, EFFECTS OF TERRORISM

Paris LE NOUVEL ECONOMISTE in French 27 Apr 81 p 50

[Interview with Basque government Economic and Financial Counselor Pedro Luis Uriarte, by Martine Royo of LE NOUVEL ECONOMISTE; date and place not given]

[Text] The Basque economy, already hurt by the world crisis, suffers from terrorism. Basque government Economic and Financial Counselor Pedro Luis Uriarte, appointed a year ago, a former professor of economics at the renowned University of Deusto (Biscaye), draws up a gloomy balance sheet of the situation of his "country" for LE NOUVEL ECONOMISTE.

LE NOUVEL ECONOMISTE: What is the chief cause of the slump in the Basque economy: the world crisis or terrorism?

Pedro Luis Uriarte: We have had a great deal of bad luck, because all kinds of trouble seem to have befallen our "country": the world crisis, of course, since there is a large concentration of the iron and steel industry, ship building, and the manufacture of equipment in the Basque country. This region is much more industrialized than the average Spanish province. But there is no doubt that terrorism has been an additional factor in the crisis. Its effects are very apparent in the case of investments, 90 percent of which come from the private sector in our region. For private investors, in particular the PMI's [Small and Medium Sized Business], who are vital to the Basque industrial fabric, terrorism is a dissuasive phenomenon. There are statistics to prove this: in 1980, the gross amount of fixed capital was positive in Spain (+2.5 percent) and negative in the Basque country (-4 percent). Also, foreign investments are not increasing, whereas they jumped upward 22 percent throughout Spain. Foreign enterprises located in our country are not moving away, but they are not investing even 1 additional peseta in the "country."

LE NE: Are manufacturers in the Basque country still the object of a systematic racket on the part of the ETA [Basque Fatherland and Liberty Group]?

PLU: More than ever. But one also notes a reaction: an increasing number of manufacturers are trying to counter this racket. It is the course to follow.

LE NE: What repercussions does the drop in investments have on production and unemployment?

PLU: Gross domestic production in the Basque country decreased 2 percent last year, whereas in the rest of Spain it increased 1.7 percent. As for unemployment, officially there are 107,000 persons, that is, 13.27 percent of the working population, compared with 12 percent in the rest of Spain. But if one adds persons in technical unemployment or in partial unemployment, this figure rises to 196,000 persons!

It is all the more serious since above all it strikes young people less than 25 years of age and because it exasperates Basque society, which can only heighten political tensions.

LE NE: To what extent does Madrid help you to solve your economic problems?

Pedro Luis Uriarte, Basque government economic and financial counselor.

PLU: The central government gives us sectorial assistance, for example, to reorganize the iron and steel industry. We are on the point of signing an assistance agreement with Madrid in behalf of the iron and steel industry which provides for the improvement of several enterprises: notably, Altos Hornos of Vizcaya, where 40 percent of the Spanish iron and steel production is concentrated. The reorganization of the special steels sector (80 or 90 percent concentration in the Basque country) is also going well. The Basque country receives a somewhat "nontraditional" appropriation from Madrid. The budget allocated to our region, for example, is calculated in accordance with criteria that might have been reasonable at the beginning of the 1970's, at the height of the expansion period, but that is no longer the case today.

8255
CSO: 3100/707

BRIEFS

VIENNA, INNSBRUCK 'HOUSE OCCUPATIONS'--Some 30 young people staged the first "house occupation" in Vienna's Windmuehlgasse on Friday evening, while another 50 "sympathizers" kicked up a row in the surrounding streets, breaking some windows and car headlights. At first police confined their activities to strictly separate the "occupiers" from the "sympathizers," but at 2120 they called in the fire department to break open the barricaded doors of the building--Windmuehlgasse 24 in Vienna's sixth district, Mariahilf--after four of the occupiers had voluntarily left the house. In the building, police detained 27 young people who did not offer any resistance. Also on Friday night, 130 young people--mostly students and apprentices--"stormed" a city-owned building in Innsbruck, General-Eccher Street. An "occupiers' council" displayed posters stressing that there were 400 empty apartments in Innsbruck whereas 3,500 students did not have a place to stay. The building is still occupied. An attempt by Deputy Mayor Niescher to induce the occupiers to give up was unsuccessful. [AU041317 Vienna DIE PRESSE in German 2-3 May 81 p 14]

MORE EAST EUROPEAN REFUGEES--In the first quarter of this year the number of refugees coming from East Europe has doubled as against the corresponding figures of last year. The Interior Ministry declared today that the refugee camps of Traiskirchen, Bad Kreuzen and Reichenau were completely overcrowded as a result of this influx of refugees. More than 3,000 refugees have already been assigned quarters in inns or private homes. Last year, 9,260 refugees came to Austria. This year, a total of 20,000 refugees from East Europe are expected to arrive. [Text] [AU061103 Vienna Domestic Service in German 1003 GMT 6 May 81]

CSO: 3103/306

GENERAL CONFEDERATION OF LABOR ELECTORAL SYSTEM DISCUSSED

Athens TO VIMA in Greek 21 Apr 81 p 2

[Article by Vas. Tzannetakos]

[Text] The "victory" of the "hard-line" government unionist core group in the conference on the by-laws of the GSEE [Greek General Confederation of Labor] constitutes the starting point for more general developments, which will lead either to the absolute "obedience" of the GSEE's leading group--which presents itself as "moderate"--to the political-ideological camp of the present government, or to the creation of problems with respect to the very survival of this leading group.

This "victory"--and in a broader sense the first serious and decisive "defeat" for the leading group--consists in the rejection by the conference of simple proportional representation as the electoral system for choosing the administration of the GSEE at the congress which will be held for this purpose in the autumn.

Despite the "objections" by "hard-line" government unionists and by leading figures who were counseling them, simple proportional representation was being promoted not only by the leading group but also by the opposition--in spite of the different views and perspectives with which the opposition characterized this electoral system.

In any case, Sunday's conference agreed to make it possible for those organizations to enter the GSEE which were outside it as of 19 April, and it also approved of the subsequent unification of like trade unions.

As the situation is shaping up now--that is, following the rejection of simple proportional representation, on the establishment of which the GSEE's leading group had based many "hopes" for its independent survival--the autumn congress is not going to mark the beginning of any democratic trend in the labor movement, even in a period of more general political changes. And this is because the majority system will be in effect for the election of the new administration. This means that with the makeup of forces which will exist--despite the enrollment of the organizations into the GSEE in the meantime--government trade unionism will be favored because no solution is provided either to the problem of the enrollment of the most important organizations into the federations and labor centers which send representatives to the GSEE congress, or to the issue of the electoral system, which will be primarily a majority system.

The rejection of the proposal by the leading group for simple proportional representation is due essentially to the ultimately "energetic" opposition of the "hard-line" governmental and junta-supporting union leaders, who at this "critical" moment decided (or rather government figures forced them to decide) to not "go along with" the "line" of the leading group. So in this way they torpedoed the materialization of certain plans--or "hopes"--of the leading group which aimed at changing the makeup of forces in the GSEE by elevating within it the representatives of the opposition, in light of political developments and the clear prospects for a change in the party which will hold political power.

The labor union leaders on the Right are maintaining even in public--something which has not happened before in recent years--that "the time is past when Karakitsos could force (on us) whatever he wanted...." And they are trumpeting that they are not disposed to cooperate in the entry of the Left into the GSEE by giving their vote for this, nor to cooperate in their own unionist "condemnation," which is what the introduction of simple proportional representation amounted to, in their eyes.

Thus, labor leaders with a pro-junta "background" began to openly attack the "initiatives" of the leading group. And as was shown by the polling results, in the vigorous lobbying which followed the leading group did not succeed in regaining control over a substantial portion of those conference members who always used to constitute its electoral base.

This "hostile" climate led the president of the GSEE to indirectly raise the issue of confidence in him personally, by letting it be understood that his presence on the trade-union scene would depend on the result of the voting.

Thus, on the basis of this statement and the rejection of the proposal made by the leading group (Editor's note: Of those conference members belonging to the pro-junta and governmental front, which up to now has been united, half voted against the proposal), it follows that there is a new and serious rift in the "unity" of the present government unionism, which is not unlikely to lead to realignments. And this is because now--certainly after the vote against simple proportional representation--the leeway for maneuvering on the part of the leading group has narrowed, and this group now appears to be a prisoner of the choices which it had made at the change of government and afterwards.

And it is characteristic that even in the period when the passage of simple proportional representation seemed realizable still, PASKE [Panhellenic Militant Workers Trade Union Movement] (Editor's note: the trade-union faction of PASOK) did not leave the leading group any room for optimism--at least behind the scenes and for the time being--about the possibility of some "conciliation" with or a "bridge" to that faction.

The officers of PASKE maintained an inflexible attitude, both more generally towards the present government trade-unionism and more specifically towards the leading group of the GSEE, despite the partial acceptance on its part of their proposals for the fundamental democratization of the labor movement. By these means, they disassociated the position of their faction from the intentions of the leading group concerning a certain long-range "understanding" between this group and the political camp which PASKE is the spokesman for.

It is indicative that officers of PASKE strongly questioned the "democratic intentions" of the GSEE and stressed that the "initiatives" of the leading group which were made "in view of positive developments for the people's movement" lead to procedures "which will permit the perpetuation of the unacceptable situation in the labor movement and will allow objectionable persons to remain in the GSEE...." They said further that the maneuvers of the leading group are misleading, and they proclaimed that "we will not give a democratic facade to the administration of the GSEE," because the October congress for the election of a new administration will not be legitimate and representative if not all unions are enrolled in the federations and labor centers and not all organizations are enrolled in the GSEE, and if simple proportional representation is not introduced for choosing the administration and the election of representatives for the congress. Speakers from the same camp also made certain indirect allusions to the policy of the "government of change" at the trade-union level, which left an impression that the executive branch would be "helping" to resolve organizational and administrative "problems" of the labor movement.

In any case, within the framework of its "initiative," the leading group reached the point of accepting the proposal for an election of congress members by simple proportional representation--the adoption of which would change radically, and to the benefit of the opposition, the makeup of forces at the autumn congress. This proposal was finally withdrawn by the GSEE because its tenor--which "doomed" the junta-government unionists--became understood by them following the "perplexities" which were voiced and the "explanations" which were inconveniently requested by representatives of ESAK-S [United Antidictatorial Labor Movement-S; expansion for the "S" is unknown]. On Sunday, this organization was marked by a certain "confusion" in its policy. This faction would have made significant electoral gains in the new administration of the GSEE if this PASKE proposal had not become the subject of its "perplexities."

The stand maintained by some spokesmen for ESAK-S (which is associated with the KKE) on certain "critical" points of the session also played a "positive" role in creating the climate which produced the rejection of simple proportional representation, since these spokesmen--probably "overstepping the line"--aggravated the climate with their interjections and their tactics and in the last analysis they functioned as a mechanism for rallying the "hard-line" rightists. Especially after one interjection by an officer of the ESAK-S, who asserted that simple proportional representation "constitutes a victory by the workers, who have compelled the GSEE to adopt this as its position," the "hard-liners" received the impression that the proposal of the leading group serves the Left, to the detriment of their own unionist and other "interests." With this interjection, the countdown began for the rejection of simple proportional representation--given that representatives of the "hard-line" junta-government core group now began to openly attack the leading group and its proposal, to argue that the opposition has no place in the GSEE, and to request the GSEE to "release" them so that they could vote "according to their conscience." These positions were "embellished" also with the familiar "flights of nationalist sentiment" and at the least with a solemn anticommunism, such as "these people (Editor's note: ESAK-S) will be the death of us with their tin cans...," and "...we believe in the Blue and White [Greek flag], and they believe in the Hammer and Sickle...," and so forth.

From the same side, views were also heard to the effect that since the various outlooks among the unionist-political movements are unbridgeable, what is needed is the ideological disassociating of the labor movement and the creation of confederations in accordance with the political alignments of their members. This proposal was also "reinforced" by the argument that this disassociation is necessary as well because of the "extra-European nature"(!) of the Greek labor movement, since in Western Europe there are confederations based on ideological and political camps (similar views were upheld indirectly also, from a seemingly dissimilar viewpoint, by an ESAK-S officer, who stated his "perplexity" with respect to how "unity can be achieved with the disrupters and strikebreakers"--that is, with almost all the present government unionists).

The situation tended to be polarized even further, to the benefit of the extreme Right, by the wording used by certain ESAK-S speakers. Regardless of the fact that they were largely correct in their remarks and their criticism about the behavior of the GSEE toward the workers' demands and problems, these speakers gave to the "hard-line" government and junta-supporting unionists a pretext for converting the convention hall into a place of shouting matches and recriminations, which aggravated feelings and removed any possibilities of a fundamental democratization of the labor movement or of an inclusion of the opposition in the new administration of the GSEE.

Furthermore, on Sunday the ESAK-S did not avoid the "temptation" to also activate mechanisms outside the session for the purpose of pleading its views, which--officially, at least--were aimed at achieving "labor unity" and the prevalence of a climate of moderation. Thus, once again it mobilized "pressure groups" under a unionist cover (representatives of unions which are outside the GSEE), which demonstrated with signs during the morning session outside the convention area. Many of these slogans, although not untruthful, did not constructively help to achieve the objectives which the ESAK-S was supposed to have set, and in any case they were an affront to those whose approval was being sought for the modifications in the by-laws.

But on the other hand, ESAK-S did participate energetically in the proceedings on the modification of the by-laws, with the submitting of proposals which were aimed at getting past the present organizational impasse of the labor movement, by allowing like trade organizations to enter the GSEE and by allowing unifications of similar unions.

It seems that these inconsistencies in the tactics of the ESAK-S are associated with certain conflicts within this group over judgments concerning the stand which it ought to hold on unionist developments.

12114
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STUDENT UNIONS, ELECTION RESULTS PUBLISHED

Analysis of Results

Athens TA NEA in Greek 4 Apr 81 p 16

[Text] Those student factions which adhere politically to the views of the parties of the democratic opposition amassed 88.5 percent of the votes and 88 percent of the seats in the elections the day before yesterday to choose the new councils in the student unions throughout the country.

Specifically, the final results of this year's elections are as follows, in numbers of votes:

Pan-Student Trade Union Movement [PSK], which associates itself with the KKE: 15,206 votes or a percentage of 32.8 percent, compared to 15,448 votes (30.1 percent) in 1980.

PASP [Panhellenic Militant Student Faction], associated with PASOK: 12,451 votes or 26.9 percent, compared to 13,110 votes (25.5 percent) in 1980.

Democratic Struggle-DE [DA-DE: expansion of letters "DE" unknown], associated with the KKE-Interior: 5,036 votes or 10.8 percent, compared to 4,462 votes (8.7 percent) in 1980.

DAP [Democratic Renewal Vanguard], which associates itself with the New Democracy Party: 5,348 votes or 11.5 percent, compared to 5,214 votes (10.1 percent) in 1980.

Second Panhellenic, which broke off from the "Rigas Feraios" organization in 1978: 3,529 votes or 7.6 percent, compared to 5,604 votes (10.9 percent) in 1980.

PPSP [Progressive Pan-Student Trade Union Faction], which adheres to the KKE/ML [Greek Communist Party/Marxist-Leninist]: 1,010 votes or 2.2 percent, compared to 2,705 votes (5.2 percent) in 1980.

Miscellaneous: 1,250 votes or 2.7 percent, compared to 1,289 votes (2.5 percent) in 1980. Invalid and blank ballots: 2,500 or 5.4 percent, compared to 3,500 (6.8 percent) in 1980.

The Factions

The student factions PASP, PSK, and DA-DE give in turn the following collective results:

PASP: 12,410--152 seats; PSK: 15,482--187; DA-DE: 4,843--58; DAP: 5,521--68; PPSP: 1,270--20; others: 4,834--54. Invalid and blank ballots: 2,427.

PSK: 15,506; PASP: 12,404; DAP: 5,790; DA-DE: 4,708; miscellaneous: 4,598; PPSP: 1,123.

DA-DE: 5,015--70 seats; PSK: 15,479--189; PASP: 12,403--141; DAP: 5,585--73; independent rallies: 2,909--32; militant rallies--PPSP: 2,594--31; miscellaneous: 866--12. Invalid and blank ballots: 2,500.

The EFEE

In referring to the student elections the day before yesterday, the National Student Union of Greece (EFEE) stresses that "the mass participation by students in the elections and the mass condemnation of the government's policy expressed by the large vote for the democratic forces is an indisputable proof of the maturity of the students.

"The Central Council of the EFEE," concludes the announcement, "calls on the new administrative councils to show themselves worthy of the votes given by the students and to strengthen their efforts to gain substantial democratic changes in the sector of advanced education."

The office of the Greek Communist Youth Central Council also issued an announcement.

The Results in Italy

The results of the elections in the Association of Greek Students in Italy are as follows:

Urbino: PASP--43; PSK--12; DA-DE--5.
Palermo: PASP--119; PSK--76; DA-DE--31; miscellaneous--21.
Florence: PASP--74; PSK--113; DA-DE--37; miscellaneous--31.
Naples: PASP--184; PSK--208; DA-DE--111; miscellaneous--67; PPSP--35.
Chieti: PASP--78; PSK--20; miscellaneous--13.
Calabria: PASP--21; PSK--8.
Pavia: PASP--235; PSK--184; DA-DE--75; miscellaneous--25; PPSP--46.
Milan: PASP--52; PSK--94; DA-DE--50; PPSP--31.
Modena: PASP--64; PSK--55; miscellaneous--42; PPSP--12.
Trieste: PASP--130; PSK--83; DA-DE--35; PPSP--79.
Messina: PASP--66; PSK--43; DA-DE--30.
Catania: PASP--59; PSK--51; DA-DE--14.
Ferrara: PASP--77; PSK--65; DA-DE--20.
Pisa: PASP--113; PSK--35; DA-DE--20; PPSP--14.
Siena: PASP--141; PSK--49; DA-DE--46.

Parma: PASP--54; PSK--24; DA-DE--34; PPSP--19.
Genoa: PASP--78; PSK--87; PPSP--27.
Brescia: PASP--24; PSK--21.
Sassari: PASP--22; PSK--10.
Rome: PASP--223; PSK--164; DA-DE--73; miscellaneous--77; PPSP--76.
Bari: PASP--91; PSK--76; DA-DE--39; miscellaneous--38.
Ancona: PASP--48; PSK--45; PPSP--9.

Editorial on Results

Athens ELEVTHEROS KOSMOS in Greek 7 Apr 81 p 1

[Text] Last Thursday, the "elections" of officers for the administrations in the student unions were conducted. And 44,844 people voted, whereas last year 50,690 had voted. But what is the student population of the country? Is it 130,000, 140,000, 150,000? Long before 2 April, the Ministry of Education should have announced the precise total for the number of regular students and undergraduates. But it did not do this. Likewise the Ministry of Education should have announced that the "elections" would be held in the absence of legal representatives and without supervision by authorized professors. It did not even do this. With these serious acts of negligence on its part, the government contributed to the impropriety of these so-called elections.

Some 2/3 of the students who have the right to vote--that is, about 100,000 people--did not take part in the elections. Nobody announced how many students are enrolled in the student unions--and how many and which of these are legally recognized. It was merely mentioned that the objective of the EFEE, which for a year now has not even elected a president (!), was to get 50,000 students to vote--the same number as in 1980. But this year more than 10 percent fewer students came to the "ballot box," where the secrecy of the voting was not safeguarded, while the invalid and blank ballots amounted to 6.20 percent (compared to 4.35 percent in 1980). Once again, for the seventh or eighth time since 1974, PASOK, the two KKE parties, and the other communist organizations (of Hoxha, Trotsky, the widow of Mao, Castro, Pol Pot of Cambodia, and so forth) "legitimized" their dominance in the advanced educational institutions. Whereas the organization associated with the New Democracy Party, the DAP-NDFK [Democratic Renewal Vanguard-New Democracy Student Movement], amassed barely 5,198 votes, some 75 votes more (!) than last year.

This is the first time (in these days of the New Democracy Party) since universities and student unions have existed in this country that the communists have been in command within them. They had not achieved this result by way of the "kind" and energetic support of the OPLA [Units for the Protection of the People's Struggle], not even during the fascist occupation!! The advanced schools are operating under a status quo of political and intellectual terrorism--as well as physical violence.

Shortly before the parliamentary elections of 20 November 1977, G. Rallis had given an interview to the APOGEVMATINI. And at this he was asserting that the then Karamanlis government had enacted legislation (!!) for the obligatory and general suffrage of the students. The truth is that the government of the

New Democracy Party hastened to withdraw a draft law to this effect, after threats and pressures from the parties and organizations on the Left. Still, it is fair, just, and democratic for all regular students and undergraduates to have the right to vote--that is, for the schools to coincide with the unions. This very simple and democratic solution was not provided either under the administrations of Karamanlis or now under the Rallis administration. And of course it is not going to be provided either during the short period of time which is left to the New Democracy Party.

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PREDICTIONS FOR JUNE LOCAL ELECTIONS

Rome L'ESPRESSO in Italian 19 Apr 81 pp 6-10

[Article by Guido Quaranta: "Whoever Wins This Time..."]

[Text] Everybody here in Rome agrees it will be a very tough fight. Some hold that we may be in for a big surprise or two. And a lot of people think it a more important political milestone by far than either the Socialist Party's national congress, now imminent, or even the six referendum votes set for 17 May. These are the opinions that float about the corridors of parliament on the forthcoming administrative elections due 2 months from now in about mid-June. Why in the world should there be such anxious concern?

First of all, because the first ballotting will involve some 9 million voters in the north, in central Italy, and in the south: a fairly broad sampling of the elusive moods abroad in the country, and one made to order for updating the temper expressed in the 1979 general elections and in last summer's local contests. There is a second reason: this latest round of ballotting will enable all the major political leaders, from Piccoli to Zanone, from Berlinguer to Craxi, to assess the real effectiveness of their several political lines, and will be a sensitive litmus test for the sitting government -- so sensitive that quite a few observers predict that once the polls are closed and the votes counted, that cabinet crisis Arnaldo Forlani has thus far managed to ward off will be inevitable.

Nor is that all. The elections involve one of the three big cities in the industrial triangle (Genoa), Rome itself, two provincial capitals (Ascoli Piceno and Foggia), a major southern bastion in Bari, and the legislature of Sicily: hanging on the votes of the electorate will be the fate of several highly visible governments and that of a whole island for the next 5 years. At stake in Genoa, for instance, is the future of a left-wing coalition that has been in office since 1976, as to which opinion is sharply divided: in City Hall they say the coalition has worked hard, outside, they say the opposite. According to the Communists, the coalition will be returned. The Socialists think so, too, although not all of them are ready to swear that their comrade, Fulvio Cerofolini (seen as a bit too far to the left in some quarters)

will head it again. For some weeks now, though, the Christian Democrats have been quietly busying themselves behind the scenes to make sure that the next administration will be a center-left one. It is hard to predict, at this point, whether or not they will succeed, but Alberto Benporad, the Social Democratic leader in Liguria, who speaks for the national leadership, is already warning that the battle in Genoa will be "very tough indeed."

The outlook in Rome for control of the Campidoglio, which has been equally red for the past 5 years, is shaping up as a real fight, and as one in which there is always a chance of upsets. The Italian Communist Party (PCI) is determined to hang onto its title as top party in the capital, and hence to hang onto the throne for its mayor, Luigi Petroselli: this is why the public relations experts on the Via delle Botteghe Oscure push getting him into the headlines ("The Way They Did It in Turin with Novelli") and playing up his hound's-tooth-clean record and his spirit of initiative. The DC people, though, are convinced that the days of huge communist gains like those of the mid-Seventies are over ("Last year, in the municipal elections in Rome, we got just about as many votes as the PCI; the time for beating them all the way is coming close"), and are directing knowing winks at the Italian Socialist Party (PSI), hoping to entice them into dumping their communist allies and to coopt them into joining in a new administration.

Down in Bari the DC is getting ready to mount a tooth-and-claw defense of the center-left coalition that has governed there for several years but, according to the polls from the parties' provincial headquarters, it will be no easy task: ever since Aldo Moro's death the coalition has been prey to spreading internecine conflict; the DC's partners are thinking about cutting it down to size; its enemies, the communists, are dangling the prospect of a leftist-laic coalition as a viable alternative.

Even Sicily (numerically the biggest game around: some 4 million voters will be going to the polls) will be a battlefield. The communists are determined to win back most of the votes they lost in the 1979 general election and in the local ones last year: this explains why their secretary, Enrico Berlinguer, was the first political leader on the scene these last few days, not only in Gela, Marsala, and Palermo, but also in little towns like Belice and Palma di Montechiaro. The Socialist Party would like, at least, to get the presidency of the regional assembly, held heretofore by communist Michelangelo Russo: to get there, the Hon Salvatore Lauricella has already vacated his seat in Montecitorio, resigning after 15 years as a Deputy. And the neo-Fascists (MSI) are nurturing hopes of a repeat performance in Sicily of their victory in the last municipal elections in Naples: one of their pet issues is restoration of the death penalty ("We'll talk about it at every rally: it brings support").

And so the hunt for votes is on, no holds barred: the stakes are, after all, the political lines of the major parties and the careers of their leaders. How will it all end? Who will win and who will lose? We asked 24 mambers of parliament and 2 ex-members who hold party office,

choosing them from various sectors of the political spectrum, all of them residents of cities in which the people will be going to the polls, and extremely sensitive to the mood of the people. In hazarding their forecasts they were all, of course, aware of the new patterns that have emerged in elections since 1976 -- the general election in 1979 and the local contests last year -- in which both the DC and the PSI gained ground, the PCI lost, and the lay parties held their own.

The prevailing view, considering what happened in 1976, is this: the Christian Democrats and the Communists will drop some, the Socialists will pick up some, the middle-of-the-road parties will see mixed returns, and the MSI will lose ground. It may be that some of the answers given us were a bit hasty, and that others were offered with a quick grab for the rabbit's foot, just in case: the final results in June will tell us which ones were on the mark, which clearly means we should take all of them with a grain of salt. Yet, unlike those we are accustomed to seeing in opinion polls taken on the eve of every election, these are complete and forthright. Not one of the men we polled, for instance, took the easy way out with an enigmatic, noncommital "I don't know."

Less for the DC, a Little Less for the PCI, More for the PSI

In the tables we publish here, the results of the communal elections in Genoa, Rome, and Bari and in the Sicilian region held in the summer of 1976 are shown in the shaded top line, and compared with the predictions for similar elections slated for the second half of June this year. Venturing the predictions were 26 politicians belonging to different parties and who, as voting residents of their own constituencies, are in intimate touch with the sentiments of their fellow-citizens. According to these forecasts -- some of them perhaps hasty and others perhaps grabbing at straws -- this is what it will be like: some shrinkage in the DC and PCI vote, slight gains for the Socialists, a little softness among the middle-of-the-road parties, and a decline for the MSI. Only the official returns in June can tell which of them is on the money and which are dead wrong.

ROME

ROMA	Dc	Pci	Psi	Psdi	Pri	Pli	Msi	Altri (2)
(1) Comunali 1976	33	35,4	7,6	3,6	4,1	1,7	10,5	4,1
S. La Rocca (Dc)	32 —1	32,5 —2,9	9,5 +1,9	3,5 —0,1	4,1 —	2 +0,3	10,5 —	5,9
A. Trombadori (Pci)	34 +1	34,5 —0,9	9 +1,4	4 +0,4	4 —0,1	1,5 —0,2	10 —0,5	2,7
R. Palleschi (Psi)	33 —1	33 —2,4	10 +2,4	3,6 —	4,1 —	2,5 +0,8	9,5 —1	4,3
S. Costi (Psdi)	34 +1	33,5 —1,9	8,2 +0,6	4,5 —0,9	4 +0,1	2 +0,3	8,5 —2	5,3
O. Mammi (Pri)	31 —2	34 —1,4	8 +0,4	4 +0,4	4,5 +0,4	2 +0,3	12 +1,5	4,5
A. Bozzi (Pli)	33 —	34 —1,4	9 +1,4	3,6 —	4,3 +0,2	3 +1,3	9,5 —1	3,6
P. Rauti (Msi)	33 —	32 —3,4	8,6 +1	4 +0,4	4,1 —	1,7 —	11 +0,5	5,6
(3) Media delle previsioni	32,8 —0,2	33,3 —2,1	8,9 +1,3	3,8 +0,2	4,1 —	2,1 +0,4	10,1 —0,4	4,5 +0,4

Key:
1. 1976 Communal Elections 2. Other 3. Average of forecasts

SICILY

SICILIA	Dc	Pci	Psi	Psdi	Pri	Pli	Msi	Altri (2)
(1) Regionali 1976	40,8	26,8	10,3	3,4	3,3	2,1	10,9	3,4
L. Giglia (Dc)	40,8 —	24 —2,8	11,3 +1	4 +0,6	4 +0,7	3 +0,9	8,9 —2	5,2
A. Spataro (Pci)	41 +0,2	24 —2,8	12 +1,7	3,4 —	3,3 —	2,1 —	8,9 —2	5,3
V. Cusumano (Psi)	38 —2,8	22,5 —4,3	16 +5,7	4 +0,6	4,5 +1,2	2,1 —	7 —3,9	5,9
P. Bandiera (Pri)	39,8 —1	23 —3,8	11,8 +1,5	3,4 —	4 +0,7	2,1 —	10 —0,9	5,9
C. Vizzini (Psdi)	38 —2,8	24 —2,8	13 +2,7	5 +1,6	4 +0,7	2,1 —	9 —1,9	4,9
B. Cottone (Pli)	40,8 —	25,8 —1	11,3 +1	3,9 +0,5	3,8 +0,5	2,1 —	9,9 —1	2,4
C. Lo Porto (Msi)	40,8 —	23,8 —3	10,3 —	3,4 —	3,3 —	2 —0,1	11 +0,1	5,4
(3) Media delle previsioni	39,8 —1	23,8 —3	12,2 +1,9	3,8 +0,4	3,8 +0,5	2,2 +0,1	9,2 —1,7	5 +1,6

Key:
1. 1976 Regional Elections 2. Other 3. Average of forecasts

BARI

BARI	Dc	Pci	Psi	Psdi	Pri	Pli	Msi	Altri (2)
(1) Comunali 1976	38	24,8	12,6	6	3,5	1,8	10,4	2,9
N. Vernola (Dc)	36 —2	21 —3,8	15 +2,4	7 +1	3,5 —	1,8 —	8 —2,4	7,7
T. Sicolo (Pci)	37 —1	23 —1,8	14,6 +2	6 —	3,5 —	4,8 +3	7,4 —3	3,6
C. Lenoci (Psi)	37 —1	22 —2,8	16 +3,4	6 —	3,5 —	1 —0,8	9 —1,4	5,5
M. Di Giesi (Psdi)	37,5 —0,5	23,8 —1	12,6 —	7 +1	3,5 —	2 +0,2	9,9 —0,5	4,7
O. Del Donno (Msi)	37,5 —0,5	23,8 —1	13 +0,4	7 +1	3,5 —	1,8 —	10,4 —	4
(3) Media delle previsioni	37 —1	22,7 —2,1	14,2 +1,6	6,6 +0,6	3,5 —	2,2 +0,4	8,9 —1,5	5,1 +2,2

Key:
1. 1976 Communal Elections 2. Other 3. Average of forecasts

GENOA

GENOVA	Dc	Pci	Psi	Psdi	Pri	Pli	Msi	Altri (2)
(1) Comunali 1976	28,5	41,5	12,4	3,7	4,6	2,4	4,5	2,3
M. Manfredi (Dc)	25 —3,5	38 —3,5	13,4 +1	4 +0,3	5 +0,4	4 +1,6	4,5 —	6
G. Gambolato (Pci)	28 —0,5	41 —0,5	12,4 —	3,7 —	4 —0,6	2,4 —	4 —0,5	3,9
F. Accame (Psi)	29,5 +1	40,5 —1	13 +0,6	3 —0,7	5 +0,4	3,5 +1,1	4 —0,5	1,5
A. Bemporad (Psdi)	27,5 —1	40 —1,5	13,4 +1	4,3 +0,6	4,6 —	3,4 +1	4 —0,5	2,8
G. Bogi (Pri)	27,5 —1	41,5 —	13 +0,6	3,7 —	4,6 —	3 +0,6	4,5 —	2,2
A. Biondi (Pli)	28 —0,5	39 —2,5	13,5 +1,1	3 —0,7	4 —0,6	5,5 +3,1	4 —0,5	3
C. Baghino (Msi)	29 +0,5	38,5 —3	13,4 +1	3 —0,7	4 —0,6	2,9 +0,5	5,5 +1	5,2
(3) Media delle previsioni	27,7 —0,8	39,7 —1,8	13,1 +0,7	3,5 —0,2	5 +0,4	3,5 +1,1	4,3 —0,2	3 +0,7

Key:
1. 1976 Communal Elections
2. Other
3. Average of forecasts

PSDI = Social Democrats
PRI = Republicans
PLI = Liberals

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